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Criminal Law
BY CONNIE VANCE SELLARS*
INTRODUCTION
The 1982 Kentucky General Assembly made a number of sig-
nificant changes in the area of criminal law. Legislative changes
include amendments and additions to the Kentucky Penal Code'
as well as revisions of extra-code provisions of the Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes (KRS) which define criminal offenses. The legisla-
ture made major procedural and substantive changes within the
Penal Code in the area of criminal responsibility by adding a new
guilty but mentally ill verdict. Important amendments also were
made to the Penal Code chapter relating to arson offenses. Other
code changes defined or created new assault and theft offenses.
New offenses were created and significant amendments were
made outside the Penal Code in the area of controlled substances.
This Survey will focus on these legislative changes.2 Additionally,
this Survey will discuss briefly a recent case construing Ken-
tucky's homicide statutes.
I. PENAL CODE CHANGES
A. Criminal Responsibility
The most significant new provision in the area of criminal re-
sponsibility3 is the addition of the guilty but mentally ill verdict 4
to the authorized verdicts of guilty, 5 not guilty6 and not guilty by
. Assistant Commonwealth Attorney, 22d Judicial Circuit, Lexington, Kentucky.
B.A. 1972, University of Illinois; J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky.
I Ky. REv. STAT. § 500.010 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS] desig-
nates KRS chapters 500 through 534 as the Kentucky Penal Code.
I No attempt is made here to discuss all substantive or procedural changes made by
the General Assembly during the Survey period. Rather, the most significant changes are
discussed.
3 For a general discussion of criminal responsibility and the insanity defense in Ken-
tucky, see Overstreet & Collier, Criminal Law, 68 Ky. L.J. 733 (1979-80).
4 KRS § 504.120(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
5 KRS § 504.120(1) (Cur. Supp. 1982).
6 KBS § 504.120(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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reason of insanity. 7 This new verdict applies to any case in which
the defendant asserts an insanity defense or offers evidence of
mental illness.8 The court or jury thus has the option of finding
the defendant guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense. 9 A
guilty but mentally ill verdict may be returned when the prose-
cution proves the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and the defendant proves by a prepondurance of the evidence
that he or she was mentally ill at the time of the offense. 10 The
statute also directs that a defendant be permitted to enter a plea
of guilty but mentally ill.1
A verdict or plea of guilty but mentally ill activates certain
statutory procedural requirements which the court must follow
before sentencing a defendant. The court must appoint at least
one psychologist or psychiatrist to examine the defendant and re-
port on his or her mental condition at the time of sentencing.12
The sentencing options available to the court depend upon
whether the defendant is found to be mentally ill at the time of
sentencing. A defendant who is no longer mentally ill at the time
of sentencing is subject to sentencing "in the same manner as a
defendant found guilty."'13 On the other hand, if the defendant is
determined to still be mentally ill, the duration of the sentence
remains the same but treatment 14 must be provided to the defen-
7 KRS § 504.120(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
8 KRS § 504.120(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
9 Id. This new verdict requires an additional instruction to the jury on guilty but
mentally ill similar to the instruction now given in cases involving the insanity defense. Cf.
J. PALMORE & R. LAWSON, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN KENTUCKY § 10.31 (1975).
10 KRS § 5 04 .130(1)(a) & (b) (Cur. Supp. 1982). Placing the burden of proving
mental illness at the time of the offense on the defendant is consistent with the placement
of the burden when insanity is a defense. See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d
380 (Ky. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 999 (1977). The Court in Edwards stated:
When one chooses to rely upon insanity as a defense, the burden rests upon
him to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that at the time the offense was
committed, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial ca-
pacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.
554 S.W.2d at 383.
" KRS § 504.130(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
12 KRS § 504.140 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Although the statute does not explicitly pro-
vide for a hearing at this time, presumably one must be held. See People v. McLeod, 288
N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1980).
13 KRS § 504.150(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
14 The term "treatment"is defined in KRS § 504.060(9) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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dant.' 5 Such treatment is to continue until the defendant is no
longer mentally ill or until expiration of his or her sentence,
whichever comes first. 16 Also, the court may impose on a guilty
but mentally ill defendant, as in the case of any guilty defendant,
a sentence of probation, shock probation or conditional dis-
charge. However, treatment must be a condition of any of these
forms of release for as long as the defendant remains mentally
illo
17
As in the case of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
a jury is not to be informed in any way (either by comments by
attorneys or jury instructions) of the possible consequences of a
guilty but mentally ill verdict.18
A final caveat should be added regarding the new legislation
in the area of criminal responsibility: it is deceptively short and
simply written.' 9 Any action under these new provisions should
be undertaken only after a careful reading of all the provisions of
chapter 504, including the changed definitions of insanity 0 and
15 KRS § 504.150(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
16 KRS § 504.150(2) (Cur. Supp. 1982).
17 Id.
18 Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981). Payne clarified previously
confused law regarding what comments to a jury on the possible consequences of a verdict
are permissible. Until recently, Kentucky cases allowed both the prosecuting attorney and
the defense counsel to comment on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity. E.g., Paul v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Ky. 1981). On the other
hand, a jury instruction on the consequences of an acquittal by reason of insanity was not
allowed. E.g., Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d at 383. In clarifying that all
comments to the jury on the consequences of an acquittal by reason of insanity are pro-
hibited, whether made by the court in jury instructions or by attorneys, the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Payne stated: "The consideration of future consequences such as treat-
ment, civil commitment, probation, shock probation, and parole have no place in the
jury's finding of fact and may serve to distort it." 623 S.W.2d at 870. The same reasoning
applies to prohibit any comment on the possible consequences of a guilty but mentally ill
verdict.
Payne might well be criticized as undermining the jury's ability to perform its role
adequately. See Fortune, Criminal Procedure, 71 Ky. L.J. No. 2 (1982-83) (published else-
where in this issue).
19 The new guilty but mentally ill verdict is contained in four brief subsections of
KRS chapter 504. See KItS §§ 504.120-.150 (Cum. Supp. 1982). In all, chapter 504 con-
tains only 12 subsections. For a discussion of some of the anticipated problems with the
new guilty but mentally ill verdict, see Aprile, A New Equation for the Insanity Defense,
THE ADVOCATE, Sept., Oct. 1982.
20 KRS § 504.060(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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mental illness.21 Clearly, the addition of the guilty but mentally
ill verdict neither abolished nor replaced the unpopular not
guilty by reason of insanity verdict.sa Moreover, the statute does
not guarantee that a defendant found guilty but mentally ill or
one entering such a plea will receive treatment, since the statute
ties treatment to a finding of mental illness at the time of sentenc-
ing.23
B. Assault
The General Assembly also added a number of new offenses
to the Penal Code chapter dealing with assault. 24 The first of
these new offenses involves recklessly causing or attempting to
cause physical injury-2 to a "state, county, city, or federal peace
officer or probation officer by means of a deadly weapon or dan-
gerous instrument."26 This new provision, which creates an of-
fense defined primarily by its special class of victims, is called as-
sault in the third degree and is a Class D felony.27 Previously, no
assault offense was a Class D felony, with the exception of assault
committed under extreme emotional disturbance.23 Under prior
law, the offense of third degree assault was a Class A misde-
meanor. 29 This misdemeanor assault is now called assault in the
fourth degree,30 but its elements are identical to those of the for-
mer third degree assault.3'
21 KRS § 504.060(5) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
2 The controversy over and criticism of the not guilty by reason of insanity verdict
was renewed recently following the acquittal of John Hinckley on the charge of attempt-
ing to assassinate President Ronild Reagan. See New York Times, Aug. 25, 1982, at 14,
col.4.
For an article criticizing the guilty but mentally ill verdict as an ill informed
"quick fix" brought about by media hype and an insensitivity to mental health problems,
see Schwartz, Moving Backward Confidently, 54 MICH. ST. B.J. 847 (1975).
2' KRS § 504.150(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
24 KRS chapter 508.
2 5 In Meredith v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), discretion-
ary review denied, (Ky. Mar. 23, 1982), the court held that for the purpose of satisfying
the physical injury element of an assault offense "when a deadly weapon or dangerous in-
strument is used intentionally .... any injury" is sufficient. Id. at 888.
2 KRS § 508.025(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
2t KRS § 508.025(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
2' KRS § 508.040(2)(a) (1975). Such an assault is of the first or second degree. Id.
29 KRS § 508.030(2) (1975).
30 KRS § 508.030(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
31 Compare KRS § 508.030(1) (1975) with KRS § 508.030(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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A new offense called criminal abuse also was added to the as-
sault chapter .32 This offense prohibits abuse33 which results in
either serious physical injury or which places the victim in either
serious physical injury or in a situation which may cause serious
physical injury, or which causes torture, cruel confinement or
cruel punishment.Y It is limited to cases involving two special
classes of victims-those twelve years of age or less and those who
are physically or mentally helpless. 5
There are three degrees of criminal abuse. The elements of
all three are identical except for the required mental states. First
degree criminal abuse requires an intentional act, 36 second de-
gree requires wanton action 37 and third degree requires a reckless
act.3 Under the new provisions, one can be guilty of criminal
abuse either by being the actual abuser or by permitting the
abuse of another person of whom he or she has actual custody.
Thus, a custodial parent can be prosecuted in cases in which his
or her child is abused by another person, e.g., abuse of a child by
a mother's live-in boyfriend. Generally, these criminal abuse of-
fenses are gap-fillers and may provide alternatives to the charges
of unlawful imprisonment or sexual abuse contained in KRS
chapters 509 and 510.40 In particular, the statute can potentially
be applied to cases involving such institutions as nursing homes.
32 KS §§ 508.100-.120 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
33KRS § 508.090(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982) defines abuse as:
the infliction of physical pain, injury, or mental injury, or the deprivation of
services by a person which are necessary to maintain the health and welfare
of a person, or a situation in which an adult, living alone, is unable to pro-
vide or obtain for himself the services which are necessary to maintain his
health or welfare.
34 KRS § 508.100(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
3 KRS § 508.090(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982) defines one who is "physically helpless" or
"mentally helpless" as a"person who lacks substantial capacity to defend himself or solicit
protection from law enforcement agencies." It should be noted that this definition is
broader than the definition of "physically helpless" in KRS § 510.010(6) (1975) relating to
unconsciousness or physical inability to refuse to do an act.
3 KRS § 508.100(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Criminal abuse in the first degree is a Class
C felony. KRS § 508.100(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
37 KRS § 508.110(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Criminal abuse in the second degree is a
Class D felony. KRS § 508.110(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
3 KRS § 508.120(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Criminal abuse in the third degree is a
Class A misdemeanor. KRS § 508.120(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
39 KRS §§ 508.100(1), .110(1), .120(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).




Significant changes were made to existing statutes governing
and defining arson offenses. 41 The first major amendment in this
area was the broadening of the definition of "building." The def-
inition is no longer limited by the "use and occupancy" require-
ments of the former provision. 42 Since an element of each of the
three degrees of arson is "intent to destroy or damage a building"
or to cause "destruction or damage to a building,"43 any broaden-
ing of the definition of a building automatically broadens the ap-
plicability of these arson statutes. The legislature also reclassified
first and second degree arson as more serious offenses; each now
carries a more substantial penalty. 44 First degree arson also was
broadened in a way other than the changed definition of "build-
ing." Under prior law, to be guilty of first degree arson, one must
have known or had reason to know that the building was occu-
pied, i.e., that a person other than an accomplice was present in
the building. 45 As amended, the statute now covers any building
which is, or a person has reason to believe is, inhabited or occu-
pied. 46 The use of the word "inhabited" implies that one can be
guilty of first degree arson in the burning of any dwelling regard-
less of whether it is in fact occupied at the time of the fire or the
suspect believes it is occupied. Another new factor which makes
an arson offense a first degree offense is the causing of a serious
physical injury to any person by the fire, explosion or the result-
ing firefighting. 47 This means that the defendant can be charged
41 KRS chapter 513 (Cum. Supp. 1982). All four of the former statutes in this chap-
ter were amended. One new statute was added.
42 Compare KRS § 513.010(1) (1975) with KRS § 513.010 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
43 KRS §§ 513.020(1) (first degree), 513.030(1) (second degree), 513.040(1) (third
degree) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Arson in the first and second degree requires "intent to de-
stroy or damage" a building while third degree arson requires wantonly causing destruc-
tion or damage by "intentionally starting a fire" to a building.
44 KRS § 513.020(3) as amended classifies arson in the first degree as a Class A felony
which carries a penalty of imprisonment for not less than 20 years nor more than life. Prior
to this amendment, the offense was a Class B felony carrying a penalty of 10 to 20 years
imprisonment. Arson in the second degree under amended KRS § 513.030(3) is now a
Class B felony, having been raised from a Class C felony.
45 KRS § 513.020(1) (1975).
46 KRS § 513.020(I)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
47 KRS § 513.020(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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with first degree arson when a firefighter is seriously injured in
the course of fighting a fire caused by arson.
D. Theft
Changes in the Penal Code chapter on theft and related of-
fenses48 include clarification of the scope of the theft by deception
statute49 and the creation of entirely new offenses relating to
stolen mail matter. 5° Prior to its amendment, the theft by decep-
tion statute applied only to deception which resulted in a person
obtaining property. 51 Now the provision also includes the offense
of obtaining services by deception. 52 This makes clear that the
theft by deception statute applies to cases involving bad checks is-
sued as payment for services. A specific provision now also makes
it an offense to issue a check in payment of any tax payable to the
Commonwealth when one knows the check will not be honored
by the drawee.0
Two new theft related offenses were created by the 1982
General Assembly. Both offenses, theft of mail matter and pos-
session of stolen mail matter,-I are classified as Class D felonies.m
Theft of mail matter57 occurs "when with intent to deprive the
owner thereof [a person] steals; by fraud or deception obtains;
embezzles; conceals; damages; or destroys any mail matter."' s
48 KRS chapter 514.
49 KRS § 514.040 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
50 KRS §§ 514.140-150 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
51 KRS § 514.040(1) (1975).
52 KRS § 514.040(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). KRS § 514.010(9) (Cum. Supp. 1982) de-
fines "services" as "labor, professional service, transportation, telephone, electricity, gas,
water or other public service, accommodation in hotels, restaurants or elsewhere, admis-
sion to exhibitions, use of vehicles or other movable property."
5 KRS § 514.040(5) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
54 KRS § 514.140 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
5 KRS § 514.150 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
'6 A Class D felony carries a penalty of one to five years imprisonment. KRS S
532.060(2)(d) (1975).
57 KRS § 514.140(1)( 0 (Cum. Supp. 1982) defines mail matter broadly as:
(including but not limited to any letter, postal card, package, bag or other
item) from any letter box, mail receptacle, or other authorized depository
for mail matter, or from a letter carrier, postal vehicle, or private mail box
or which has been left for collection or delivery adjacent thereto by the
United States postal service.
8 KRS § 514.140 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
1982-83]
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Possession of stolen mail matter is committed by one who "pos-
sesses; buys; receives; conceals; deals in; or sells any mail mat-
ter"59 which he or she knows or has reason to believe has been the
subject of theft. 6 These new offenses fill a gap left in pre-existing
laws. For example, under previous laws, theft or possession of
unindorsed government checks which had been stolen from the
mails would not constitute a felony offense. Such unindorsed
checks were merely pieces of paper without value, and criminal
charges could be brought only in cases involving a forged docu-
ment. 61
II. CHANGES OUTSIDE THE PENAL CODE:
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
The legislature also enacted laws outside the Penal Code
which relate to criminal prosecutions. Specifically, the legisla-
ture enacted several new provisions and made important changes
in some existing regulations relating to controlled substances.62
New laws enacted include the prohibition of certain practices
concerning substances which simulate controlled substances63
and laws prohibiting possession, sale or advertising of drug para-
phernalia.64
The statute concerning substances which simulate controlled
substances prohibits the sale or transfer of any non-controlled
substance "with the representation or upon creation of an im-
pression that the substance which is sold or transferred is a con-
trolled substance."68 Further prohibited actions include the pos-
session for sale or transfer of any substance, controlled or non-
59 KRS § 514.150(1) (Curn. Supp. 1982).60 Id.
61 The possible felony charges in such a case would be either forgery in the second de-
gree under KRS § 516.030 (1975) or criminal possession of a forged instrument in the sec-
ond degree under KRS § 516.050 (1975).
62 KRS chapter 218A (1982).
63 KRS § 218A.350 (1982).
64 KRS § 218A.500 (1982). For a discussion about drug paraphernalia laws, see
Note, Constitutionality of Drug Paraphernalia Laws, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 581 (1981).
6 By covering non-controlled substances, this new law fills a gap left in prior law
pertaining to counterfeit substances which, by statutory definition, must be a controlled
substance. KRS § 218A.010(3) (1972, amended 1974).
66 KRS § 218A.350(1) (1982).
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controlled, which is designed to simulate a controlled sub-
stance. 67 Such simulation may be by "design of the item or its
container, markings, or color." 6 An example of such simulation
would be simulated methaqualone tablets bearing the marking
"Rorer 714" or "Lemmon 714."' Finally, the new statute pro-
hibits manufacturing, packaging, repackaging, advertising or
marking any non-controlled substance for the purpose of creating
the impression that the substance is a controlled substance. 70 Be-
lief that the non-controlled substance was in fact a controlled
substance is not a defense to prosecution under this statute. 71
Another addition to chapter 218A is the prohibition of cer-
tain acts in connection with drug paraphernalia.72 This new stat-
ute prohibits the use or possession with intent to use, delivery or
possession with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to
deliver drug paraphernalia where, under the circumstances, one
knows or reasonably should know its intended use.73 Placing any
advertisement in a publication where one knows or reasonably
should know the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the
sale of items for use as drug paraphernalia also is prohibited.7 A
lengthy definition of drug paraphernalia is included in the stat-
ute.75 This definition covers any "equipment, products and mate-
rials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for
use" in connection with a controlled substance in any stage from
planting to its introduction into the body. 76 Another section of
the statute enumerates several factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether an item not specifically listed in the definition
section is drug paraphernalia.77
In addition to adding the new offenses relating to controlled
substances, the General Assembly also made a number of signif-
67 KRS § 218A.350(2) (1982).
8 Id.
69 Drugs of Abuse, 22-23, reprinted from DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Vol. 6, No. 2.
70 KRS § 218A.350(4) (1982).
71 KRS § 218A.350(6) (1982).
72 KRS § 218A.500 (1982). Violation of § (2), (3) or (4) of this statute constitutes a
Class A misdemeanor (possible 12 months imprisonment, KRS § 532.090(1) (1975)).
73 KRS §§ 218A.500(2), (3) (1982).
74 KRS § 218A.500(4) (1982).
75 KS § 218A.500(1) (1982).
76 Id.
77 KRS § 218A.510 (1982).
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icant amendments to existing statutes dealing with penalties. The
first of these concerns new penalties for trafficking in mari-
juana.78 Under the previous provision, the penalty was based on
whether the trafficking violation was a first offense or a subse-
quent offense.79 Now, two new alternative factors are to be con-
sidered. The first factor is the quantity of marijuana involved
and the second factor is the relative ages of the buyer and seller of
the marijuana. s0 The three separate penalties for trafficking in
marijuana which are based on the amount of marijuana involved
distinguish offenses involving less than eight ounces, amounts be-
tween eight ounces and five pounds and amounts in excess of five
pounds.8' A separate penalty, with no mention of quantity, is set
out for trafficking in marijuana by anyone eighteen years of age
or older to anyone under eighteen years of age.82 In addition to
the new penalties for trafficking in marijuana, application of the
Class B misdemeanor penalty for possession of marijuana for per-
sonal use is now limited to cases involving less than eight ounces
of marijuana. 3
Another new section in the controlled substances chapter
deals with the planting, cultivating or harvesting of marijuana.'"
This statute prohibits such activity and includes a presumption of
production for sale if the number of marijuana plants involved is
twenty-five or more.85 However, the statute also points out that
no owner, occupant or person having control or management of
land on which marijuana is planted, cultivated or harvested shall
78 KRS H 218A.990(4)-(6) (1982).
79 KRS § 218A.990(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
80 See KRS § 218A.990(4)-(5) (1982).
81 KRS § 218A.990(4) (1982). Trafficking in a quantity of marijuana less than eight
ounces carries a penalty of confinement in the county jail for not more than one year or a
fine of not more than $500, or both. When the quantity involved is between eight ounces
and five pounds, trafficking in marijuana is a Class D felony which carries a penalty of one
to five years in the penitentiary. It should be noted that no fine is mentioned here. Traf-
ficldng in quantities in excess of five pounds is punishable by confinement in the peniten-
tiary for a period of five to 10 years and a fine of $5,000 to $10,000. Id.
82 KRS § 218A.990(5) (1982). A first offense under this statute is classified as a Class
D felony with each subsequent offense classified as a Class C felony.
83 KRS § 218A.990(9) (1982).
'4 KRS § 218A.990(6) (1982).
85 KRS § 218A.990(6)(b) (1982).
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be found guilty under this statute without proof of that person's
knowledge of such activity. s6
A discussion of penalties pertaining to drug related offenses is
not complete without mentioning Commonwealth v. McGin-
nis. 7 In McGinnis, the court of appeals upheld a Fayette Circuit
Court ruling that there is no rational difference between mari-
juana and hashish which justifies applying different penalties to
offenses involving hashish and marijuana. 88 The court further
stated that the statutory definition of marijuana is so broad that
it includes hashish. 9 Therefore, under McGinnis, the penalties
which apply to offenses involving marijuana also must apply to
offenses involving hashish.
Another problem concerning the classification of controlled
substances was solved by an amendment to KRS section
218A.990(7). It had been argued with little success that since co-
caine is not classified medically as a narcotic, it should not be
classified as a narcotic for legal purposes. ° By amending KRS
section 218A.990(7) to specifically apply the same penalty to of-
fenses involving cocaine as is applied to offenses involving sub-
stances classified as Schedule II narcotics, the legislature has
treated cocaine as a narcotic for penalty purposes without so clas-
sifying it.91 As a result, defense attorneys are unable to argue that
the legal classification of cocaine as a narcotic is unreasonble and
without rational basis.
III. CASE LAw
One court decision in the area of criminal law deserves spe-
cial mention. In Commonwealth v. Hollis,9' 2 the court of appeals
88 KRS S 218A.990(6)(c) (1982).
'7 641 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. Ct. App.), dkcretionary review vacated, 641 S.W.2d 42 (Ky.
1982) 8 Hashish and marijuana are both classified as Schedule I controlled substances by
KRS § 218A.050(3) (1982). However, marijuana violations are singled out for the applica-
tion of different, more lenient, penalties. KRS §§ 218A.990(2), (4), (8), (9) (1982).
89 641 S.W.2d at 46.
90 See, e.g., Cardwell v. State, 575 S.W.2d 682 (Ark. 1979); Illinois v. McCarty, 427
N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1981).
91 KRS § 218A.990(7) (1982).92 No. 81-CA-2551-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 21, 1982), (29 Ky. L. SuMM. 6, at 7 [here-




held that a viable fetus may be a "person" for the purpose of a
criminal prosecution under Kentucky's homicide statutes.93 The
Kentucky Supreme Court has granted discretionary review. 94
The Hollis case involved a defendant who put his hand into the
vagina of his pregnant wife, causing the woman's womb to split
and forcing the fetus into the woman's abdomen. The unborn
fetus died as a result and was removed from the mother's abdo-
men by surgery. The defendant was indicted for murder in that
his intent was to cause the death of the unborn child and his
wanton conduct did cause the death of a viable fetus. The circuit
court dismissed the indictment, reasoning that under existing
law, a fetus was not a person as contemplated by the homicide
statutes. The Commonwealth appealed this ruling.
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the indictment
and remanded the case for trial. The appellate court stated that
the older position in infanticide cases which required proof that a
child had breathed and had a complete and separate existence of
its own was outmoded and should no longer apply.9 5 The court
went on to point out that rights of action for loss of or injury to a
parent have been afforded to unborn infants and, further, that
Kentucky permits recovery for damages in cases of wrongful
death of a viable fetus. 91 Based on these legal developments, the
court reasoned that "[ilf an unborn fetus is a person for the pur-
poses referred to above, we cannot perceive any sound reason
why it should have any less status when it has become an alleged
murder victim." 9' With this ruling, the court has opened the way
for homicide prosecutions in a variety of unusual and interesting
situations. Practitioners should be alert to the Kentucky Supreme
Court's resolution of this important case.
93 29 KLS 6, at 8.
'M No. 82-SC-634-DG (Ky. Sept. 14, 1982).
95 29 KLS 6, at 8. The traditional position is reflected in Jackson v. Commonwealth,
96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ky. 1936).
96 29 KLS 6, at 8.97 Id.
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